This essay aims to establish that arguments which seek to use relativity theory to endorse any form of externalism or four-dimensional space-time “blocks” of reality are inherently mischaracterizing relativity. It is argued that attempts like Putnam’s are especially misguided if one attempts to use a combination of classical presentism and special relativity STR to support externalism, as the former is precisely what the latter rejects. The essay proceeds as follows: section will provide a summary and analysis of Putnam’s argument. It will be argued that the argument fails to establish the desired conclusion as two of its premises mutually exclude each-other. Section 2 explores an implicit assumption in Putnam’s argument; that events in the future of one world-line are capable of being simultaneous with another world-line. It will be shown that a specialization of time, however common, is a mischaracterization of the fusion of time and space under relativity. Finally, section 3 will attempt to provide a more accurate description of what relativity implies for the dialectic in the metaphysics of time.